

An interesting example of how "positive law" (actual regulations) reflects "living law" (unwritten societal norms; the terms are taken from Northrop, 1962: 427), is the following: After the 1973 oil crisis, the governments of all Western European countries felt a need—or had an excuse in the face of public opinion—to establish or at least consider maximum speeds on highways. Whether these speeds are actually respected is irrelevant here; the concern is with formal law, not the practice (although practice will be affected to some extent by formal law). The statistical analysis shows across 14 Western European countries a significant correlation ($\rho = .59$) of the maximum speeds adopted with the countries' UAI-scores. Maximum speeds are also a means to reduce fatal accidents on highways. We could assume, naively, that the countries with the highest traffic death rates before the oil crisis would have chosen the lowest maximum speeds. The statistical analysis has also explored the relationship between maximum speeds, HERMES indices, and traffic deaths. The naive logic about maximum speeds does not hold; countries with higher accident mortality have not tended to adopt lower maximum speeds. Governments do not legislate just on the basis of facts, but at least as much on the basis of prerational values. I have also observed that in countries which allow high speeds, experts prove regularly that speed reduction will not make traffic safer; in countries which allow lower speeds, experts prove the opposite. Expertise is not value-free either. I interpret the higher maximum speeds in higher UAI countries as a higher value attributed to saving time than to saving lives.

We say that UAI scores in some countries correlated with citizen competence; this is one aspect of the relationship of the citizen versus the authorities. One issue on which modern nations differ and which, for example, cuts right through the 14 Western European countries considered above, is whether a citizen is obliged to carry an identity card or document which he or she must produce at the request of the police or other authorities. In the lower UAI countries (Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Great Britain, Norway, the Netherlands, and Finland) this obligation does not exist (although many people do carry credit cards and other material for convenience): Not being able to identify oneself to a policeman is no offence. In the higher UAI countries (Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland) this obligation exists and is usually maintained very strictly.¹⁷

The identity card obligation splits the countries almost perfectly according to UAI level.¹⁸ The relationship of the citizen to the authorities and vice versa is different in the two kinds of countries; in lower UAI countries the citizen feels more competent, and if the authorities want to identify him or her, the burden of proof is on the authorities; in countries where the societal norm is one of greater uncertainty avoidance, the citizen feels more at the mercy of the authorities and his or her dependency is accentuated by the continuous need to be able to justify his or her identity by carrying a document.

Another sign of the norms prevalent in a country is the relative priority given to the training of experts versus lay personnel for certain tasks. We can expect that countries higher in UAI will be more likely to train experts. This can be proved on data published by Gaspari and Millendorfer on the number of nurses per doctor in 15 countries. The average number of nurses to one doctor in a country correlates strongly with the countries' UAI ($r = -.80$). There are many activities in hospitals

which can be done either by doctors or by nurses. It is clear that in more uncertainty-avoiding countries, there is a greater tendency to have doctors carry out these activities. I interpret this as a consequence of the stronger belief in expert knowledge.

Religions, Games, and Risk-Taking

In trying to account for differences in power distance, I argued that differences in religion by themselves did not account for differences in power distance; both the adoption of a certain religion and a dominant value for power distance should be seen rather as a result of a common cause; but once a religion has been established in a country, it will reinforce the values that led to its being adopted. Power distance deals with the relationship between man and his fellowmen, in which the supernatural is only indirectly involved. In the introductory section to this chapter, religion has been referred to as one of the three fundamental ways for human society to cope with uncertainty. We can postulate now that in countries with a greater need for uncertainty avoidance, we will find more often religions that stress absolute certainties and that are intolerant of other religions.

For the 29 countries in my sample of 40 which are predominantly Christian, there is a strong tendency for the more Catholic (Roman Catholic or Orthodox) countries to show higher UAI values than the more Protestant countries. Catholicism puts a much stronger accent on life after death and the believer's ability to ensure his participation in it than do most Protestant groups; also, Catholicism stresses certainties like the infallibility of the Pope and the uniqueness of the Church. Protestantism, and especially Calvinism, encourages worldly ways to cope with uncertainty (technology and law) as willed by God rather than ritual ways (see Weber, 1930 [1976]: 224). On the UAI scale, 15 out of the 19 highest-scoring countries are Catholic. With them Japan seems out of line, although a Chinese writer states that "it is not generally realized how much more important religion and religious affiliation are to the Japanese than to the Chinese" (Hsu, 1971: 40). Ancestor worship in Japan can be seen as a form of religious coping with uncertainty. With the Catholic countries, but somewhat on the lower side as far as their UAI scores go, we also find three Moslem countries (Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran), and one Judaic country. These other two great revelation religions, while claiming absolute truths, show greater tolerance toward others than does official Roman Catholicism.

On the low side of the UAI scores, besides the mixed Catholic-Protestant and the Protestant countries, we find four Buddhist countries (Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Singapore) and Hindu India. The Eastern religions are less concerned with the absolute and are more tolerant; certainties are not imposed from the outside but may come through meditation. The Chinese have been described as showing an "exceedingly relativistic sense of morality" (Inkeles and Levinson, 1969: 481-482).

In summary, religion and uncertainty avoidance appear to be meaningfully related. Whether religion is the root cause of UAI differences is unclear; the fairly low UAI scores for Catholic Ireland and the Philippines suggest that other influences are at work as well. However, religion certainly reinforces uncertainty avoidance differences.

What applies to religions also applies to ideologies, which are secular religions. Dogmatic, intolerant ideological positions are more likely in countries with a higher

cial science research in the Anglo-American tradition often suffers from a lack of such theory. A lot of energy is wasted in fishing expeditions equipped with powerful computing tools which are doomed to find only trivialities because they do not know what to look for (see also my search for a theory-first approach described in Chapter 2). A marriage between a high UAI concern for theory and a low UAI tolerance for empiricism seems a promising solution.²⁰ In general, collaboration and exchange among scholars of different national backgrounds, and therefore different scientific approaches, can only benefit all.²¹

The Uncertainty Avoidance Norm and Its Origins

An integrated picture of what the general societal norm behind the "low UAI" and "high UAI" syndromes stands for is presented in Figure 4.3, which uses inferences from the survey data summary of Figure 4.2 and from the subsequent analysis of correlations of UAI with country-level characteristics.

As in the case of the Power Distance norm (Figure 3.7), the Uncertainty Avoidance norm is meant to be a value system shared by the majority in the middle classes in a society. The UAI norm deals with the level of anxiety about the future in a country and the consequent need to protect society through three kinds of measures: technology, rules, and rituals. The higher anxiety leads to higher stress and a more hurried social life, but also to higher energy release, which means an inner urge to work hard, and to a stronger superego needed to control dangerous impulses. On the high UAI side, anxiety is released more through the showing of aggressiveness and emotions for which society has created outlets; on the low UAI side, anxiety is released more through passive relaxation, and showing of aggressiveness and emotions is not approved of socially. On the other hand, the higher aggressiveness level on the high UAI side makes conflict and competition between people into something more threatening than is the case in the low UAI countries. People in high UAI countries feel a greater need for consensus; group decisions are ideologically popular, although not necessarily more frequent. Tolerance toward people with different ideas or showing deviant behavior and toward people from other countries is more present on the low UAI side. This tolerance also stretches to young people and their ideas, which are believed to be more of a potential threat in high UAI countries. Change in these countries is resisted more emotionally; there is a greater tendency to conservatism and a desire for law and order. Achievement in life on the high UAI side is more sharply defined in terms of acquired security, which is quite different from the "achievement motive" described by McClelland; the latter is related more to social recognition and fits the low UAI syndrome; it also implies more willingness to take risks. The high UAI side looks for the absolute, both in science and in legislation; relativism and pragmatism belong more on the low UAI side. The ritual element in the high UAI societies is represented in a belief in experts who, like "priests," are beyond uncertainty. A consequence of the belief in experts and expertise is that lay citizens are not encouraged to take the initiative in their jobs. There is more of a feeling of incompetence among ordinary members of organizations toward issues not within their immediate activity range.

The UAI norm reflects on the societal level some of the components of Adorno et al.'s (1950) Authoritarian Personality and Eysenck's (1954) Tough-Mindedness. The

UAI norm. In general, we can expect that problems more often will be looked at ideologically in higher UAI countries and pragmatically in lower UAI countries.

Another form in which uncertainty avoidance can be manifested is the kinds of games played in a certain culture. An anthropological study of games in traditional cultures (Roberts et al., 1959) distinguishes three kinds of games: games of physical skill, which aim at mastery of the self and the environment; games of strategy, which aim at mastery of the social system; and games of chance, which aim at mastery of the supernatural. These resemble the three categories to which I referred in the introduction to this chapter: technology, law, and religion. It is very likely that differences in uncertainty avoidance among countries will be reflected in the frequency and the types of game-playing behavior. The study by Roberts et al. (1959: 602) suggests that games of chance are more often present in primitive tribes when the gods are seen as less aggressive and more benevolent. If the ascribed aggressiveness of the gods reflects the aggressiveness of the particular society, we can hypothesize that games of chance will be played more often in countries with low uncertainty avoidance. Unfortunately, I have not yet been able to locate data on the frequency of chance games in modern nations. In comparing Great Britain and Germany, at least, the relationship between low uncertainty avoidance and the frequency of chance games seems to hold.

An interest in chance games as part of a national culture is likely to correlate with greater willingness in managers to make risky business decisions. For the time being, I have no data on this issue, but, impressionistically, at least British and U.S. managers seem more willing to make risky decisions than, for example, German and French managers.

UAI and Theory Versus Empiricism

In Chapter 3 I argued that a country's PDI norm affects the type of theories about power that will be developed in that country; elitist theories in high PDI countries, pluralist theories in low PDI countries. A country's UAI norm affects the type of intellectual activity in the country in an even more fundamental way. In high UAI countries, scholars look for certainties, for Theory with a capital T, for Truth.¹⁹ In low UAI countries they take a more relativistic and pragmatic stand and look for usable knowledge. The Nobel Index described in Chapter 3 correlates nearly as highly (negatively) with UAI as with PDI (-.46), which means more Nobel prizes in the applied physical sciences for lower UAI countries. The difference between the high UAI and low UAI approach is even more pronounced in the social sciences. The great theoreticians and philosophers of the west tend to come from higher UAI countries, especially Germany and Austria: Kant, Marx, Freud, Weber, and Popper, to mention but a few. On the other hand, up to the present day empirical studies in the social sciences in such high UAI countries as Germany and France are rare; in a society with a high Uncertainty Avoidance norm, it seems that scholars cannot run the risk of exposing their truths to experiments with unpredictable outcomes. On the other hand, lower UAI countries like the United States and Great Britain show a multitude of empirical studies. The orthodox methodological justification of such studies is that the progress of scientific knowledge passes through the falsification of hypotheses in testing them on reality; but to actually attempt to falsify one's hypotheses means a large tolerance for uncertainty. Of course, good hypotheses presuppose good theory. So-

FIGURE 4.3 The Uncertainty Avoidance Societal Norm

Low UAI	High UAI
• The uncertainty inherent in life is more easily accepted and each day is taken as it comes. • Ease, lower stress. • Time is free. • Hard work is not a virtue per se. • Weaker superegos. • Aggressive behavior is frowned upon. • Less showing of emotions. • Conflict and competition can be contained on the level of fair play and used constructively. • More acceptance of dissent. • Deviance is not felt as threatening; greater tolerance. • Less nationalism. • More positive toward younger people. • Less conservatism. • More willingness to take risks in life. • Achievement determined in terms of recognition. • Relativism, empiricism. • There should be as few rules as possible. • If rules cannot be kept, we should change them. • Belief in generalists and common sense. • The authorities are there to serve the citizens.	• The uncertainty inherent in life is felt as a continuous threat that must be fought. • Higher anxiety and stress. • Time is money. • Inner urge to work hard. • Strong superegos. • Aggressive behavior of self and others is accepted. • More showing of emotions. • Conflict and competition can unleash aggression and should therefore be avoided. • Strong need for consensus. • Deviant persons and ideas are dangerous; intolerance. • Nationalism. • Younger people are suspect. • Conservatism, law and order. • Concern with security in life. • Achievement defined in terms of security. • Search for ultimate, absolute truths and values. • Need for written rules and regulations. • If rules cannot be kept, we are sinners and should repent. • Belief in experts and their knowledge. • Ordinary citizens are incompetent versus the authorities.

latter stands, among other things, for intolerance of ambiguity.²² However, not all aspects of an individual personality syndrome are necessarily reflected in a societal norm. The UAI norm also reflects a number of values which Eckhardt (1971) found to be associated with people—both wealthy and poor—who placed themselves politically to the “right” in 18 different countries: personal conformity, no personal benevolence, resistance to social change, lack of political interest, never writing to a newspaper to express a point of view, interest in national rather than international affairs, national loyalty, and wanting national leadership.

The origins of the UAI syndrome are much less clear than were the origins of the PDI syndrome; it is not possible to develop a “causal chain” that leads to a high or low UAI norm with any degree of plausibility (compared with Figure 3.8). Whatever indications the data provide about origins of UAI are collected in Figure 4.4. The origins mentioned are in the areas of modernization, population density in relation to wealth, religion, and the history of legislation; additional factors are the mean age of the population, especially of its leaders, and the size of organizations.

Consequences of Different UAI Levels

Figure 4.5 assembles the various suggested consequences of high and low UAI levels. The potential consequences for society at large and for religious life and philosophical and ideological thinking have been discussed in the previous pages. The greater popularity of ideological thinking which I attribute to higher UAI countries also means that the tolerable size of discrepancies between the desirable and the desired and between the desired and actual behavior is larger in high UAI countries than in low ones (compare Figure 1.3).

FIGURE 4.4 Origins of National Uncertainty Avoidance Index Differences

Low UAI	High UAI
• Advanced modernization • Older democracies • Dense populations in poor countries; sparse populations in wealthy countries • Tolerant religions stressing relativity • Historical events: less legislation, more settlement of disputes by negotiation and/or conflict • Low mean age of population leaders • Smaller organizations	• Beginning modernization: high rate of change in society • Younger democracies • Sparse populations in poor countries; dense populations in wealthy countries • Intolerant religions stressing absolute certainties, the hereafter, and sin • Historical events: inheritance of developed system of legislation • High mean age of population leaders • Larger organizations

The consequences for organizations follow from the role which uncertainty plays in determining organization structures and processes. In general, a greater need for uncertainty avoidance should lead to what Pugh (1976: 68) in the Aston studies subsumes under the heading "structuring of activities": formalization, specialization, and standardization. A certain amount of cross-national comparative data on organization structures has been collected with the Aston methods; an overall comparison is given in Hickson et al. (1979). These studies show a wide variance of structures within each country; whatever systematic difference in structuring of activities (or concentration of authority) may exist among countries is hidden by this within-country variance. Proving systematic differences in degree of structuring of activities between countries will demand either data on far more organizations per country or better-matched samples. In this respect it should be interesting to apply Aston-type measures to subsidiaries of the same multinational companies in various countries. Those applying the Aston approach to different countries run the risk of a reverse ecological fallacy (Chapter 1). Structure variables, even if they are correlated within different countries, are not necessarily correlated across societies. Whereas the main dimensions—that is, "structuring of activities" and "centralization of authority"—probably are found universally, the individual measurements used to locate organizations on these dimensions may have to be changed if the purpose is comparison across countries.

In comparing Britain and the United States Inkson et al. (1970) could not use "structuring of activities" as a homogeneous dimension for international comparison because, while no differences were found in specialization and standardization, Britain was systematically lower on one aspect of formalization: reliance on written rules. Only an analysis of structural data from a number of societies—for example, 15 or 20—could reveal in what way structural variables are clustered across societies.

FIGURE 4.5 Consequences of National Uncertainty Avoidance Index Differences

See page	Low UAI	High UAI
	<i>Consequences for Society at Large</i>	
131	• Slower economic growth after World War II	• Faster economic growth after World War II
141	• Weaker nationalism	• Stronger nationalism
133	• Less aggressiveness versus other nations	• Greater aggressiveness versus other nations
135	• "Looser" societies	• "Tight" societies
134	• Stronger feelings of citizen competence	• Greater dependence of citizens on authorities
136		
134	• More tolerance for citizen protest	• Less tolerance for citizen protest
134	• Civil servants positive toward politics	• Civil servants dislike politics

FIGURE 4.5 (Continued)

135	• More casuistic approach to legal issues	• More elaborate legal system
136	• Lower speed limits and fewer fatal road accidents	• Faster car-driving admitted and more fatal road accidents
136	• Stronger accent on lay competence: more nurses per doctor	• Stronger accent on expertise: fewer nurses per doctor
	<i>Consequences for Religious Life and Philosophical and Ideological Thinking</i>	
137	• Either no state religions or more de facto religious tolerance	• More intolerant state religions
137	• Pragmatic or introvert, meditative religions	• Activist religions
138	• Relativism	• Search for absolute truth
138	• Practical contributions to knowledge	• Theoretical contributions to knowledge
138	• Empiricism in social sciences	• Theoricism in social sciences
138	• Pragmatic thinking popular	• Ideological thinking popular
	<i>Consequences for Organizations</i>	
142	• Less structuring of activities	• More structuring of activities
142	• Fewer written rules	• More written rules
144	• More generalists or amateurs	• Larger number of specialists
144	• Organizations can be pluriform	• Organizations should be as uniform as possible (standardization)
144	• Managers more involved in strategy	• Managers more involved in details
144	• Managers more interpersonal oriented and flexible in their style	• Managers more task-oriented and consistent in their style
138	• Managers more willing to make individual and risky decisions	• Managers less willing to make individual and risky decisions.
123	• High labor turnover	• Lower labor turnover
123	• More ambitious employees	• Less ambitious employees
123	• Lower satisfaction scores	• Higher satisfaction scores
144	• Less power through control of uncertainty	• More power through control of uncertainty
145	• Less ritual behavior	• More ritual behavior

Child and Kieser (1979) found that whereas most decisions were made at higher management levels in Germany than in Britain, some key decisions were made at higher levels in Britain. Obviously, the decisions selected determine on which side one finds more centralization. Child and Kieser also find more managerial job descriptions in Britain than in Germany; but it is unlikely that German organizations are overall less formalized than British ones. Other variables may interact with the measurements: For example, Heller et al. (1976: 24) show that in their sample in Great Britain older managers centralized their decisions less than younger ones, whereas in Germany older managers centralized more.

It is in line with the greater rule orientation and with the more elaborate legal system for organizations in higher UAI countries to have more structuring of activities and more written rules—other factors being equal. It is also in line with the value differences found for organizations in higher UAI countries to appoint more specialists (see the evidence for the greater popularity of specialized roles in higher UAI countries on page 123). Finally, I assume for organizations in higher UAI countries greater standardization: We can expect the ideal model of an organization on the higher UAI side to be uniform; on the lower UAI side, more diverse.

We can relate the UAI scores to the findings of Horovitz (1978) in his interviews with executives in France, Germany, and Great Britain. He found that French and German top managers want to be better informed of the details of their business than do British top managers: The latter engage more in strategic activities. Keeping an eye on details is a clear sign of uncertainty avoidance.

Managers in higher UAI countries are likely to be more task-oriented, as was manifested by their lower LPC scores. An illustrative incident is that in one phase of the HERMES survey, two questions about whether managers were seen as task-oriented were suppressed in the two higher UAI countries Japan and Germany, although they belonged to the compulsory core of the questionnaire. Local management considered these questions superfluous and/or unacceptable. When the questions were used in Germany in another survey phase, it appeared that, contrary to managers in other countries, managers in Germany seen as representing different leadership styles did not receive significantly different scores on the task-orientation issues.

Heller et al. (1976: 15) compared samples of managers from eight countries as to the degree to which they centralized decisions for 12 different problems; both according to their subordinates and according to themselves. From the eight countries, the Germans had the most consistent decision style across the 12 problems, the British the most flexible one. It seems that once a style is set, Germans tend to stick to it throughout.

The UAI norm in a country may also affect the exercise of power in organizations. "Power" in organizations is not just power among people whose exercise is affected by a PDI norm. Power in organizations is also exercised among groups and subsystems of organizations, and this type of power is strongly affected by the control of uncertainty (Crozier, 1964a: 107ff). If the societal norm is one of lower tolerance of uncertainty, those who control uncertainty will be more powerful than if uncertainty is more easily tolerated. This explains the difference between Indian, French, and German "authoritarianism." In India it is pure personal power ("a basic fact of society which antedates good or evil"; see Figure 3.7). In France it is the same, *plus* the

fact that power holders control uncertainties, to confront which would be too threatening to many people. In Germany "the use of power should be legitimate" (Figure 3.7), but the impact of formal power is strong because of the uncertainties it controls, which corresponds to many people's profound needs.

Finally, it is likely that the various forms of ritual behavior in organizations described in the beginning of this chapter will be found more frequently in organizations in high UAI societies. The variations in UAI among countries and their various correlated phenomena illustrate the non-rational component in the structuring of activities in human institutions, organizations, and society. This structuring of activities serves a deep-seated human need for avoiding the uncertainties inherent in human life, but the strength of this need for uncertainty avoidance differs among nations, groups within nations, and individuals.

Structuring of activities is, both in theory and in practice, usually defended on rational grounds. On the other hand, there is in organizational folklore and in daily life, in jokes, anecdotes, and humorous literature, much evidence that the rational purposes often are not achieved. Theories which explicitly recognize the non-rational element in structuring of activities are rarer, and their consequences for the validity of other theories and for practice often are not drawn. A further development of such non-rational theories (like the work of March and Olsen, 1976) should be strongly encouraged. In this regard, studies across different cultures with different subjective "rationalities" can be useful.

NOTES

1. "Above all we want release from fear . . . And in the end most fears . . . are forms of fear of the unknown. So we are all the time pressing for assurances that the unknown is known really, and that what it contains is something we are going to want anyway. We embrace religions which assure us that we shall not die, and political philosophies which assure us that society will become perfect in the future" (Magee, 1975: 88, based on Karl Popper).
2. Non-rational and non-logical is not the same as irrational and illogical. The former are meant to be value-free statements describing the origins of behavior; the latter have negative value connotations implying that a behavior is wrong.
3. Another attempt at uncertainty reduction is found in the construction of "world models" which try to describe what will happen to the world, given certain assumptions. For a fundamental critique of such models see Faucheux et al. (1976). Their basic argument is that social systems are different from physical systems: People in the system adapt to changing situations to an extent which makes extrapolation useless. They advocate using models in a normative rather than in a descriptive way, to show what should be done in order to get somewhere.
4. A variance analysis of the scores on the "stress" question can be found in Chapter 2, Figure 2.3. The variance in stress scores due to country and due to occupation are both significant, but the country effect is much stronger than the occupational effect.
5. The variance in stress scores due to other organizational factors may be considerable: For example, in one large office with about 350 persons divided into 23 working groups, groups mean scores on the "nervous or tense" question varied between 2.69 and 3.56. The differences

between the extreme groups are statistically significant in spite of the small size of the groups (nine and 13 persons, difference of means, tested by t-test, two-tailed, significant at .05 level). Discovering such differences on this and other questions and feeding them back to the manager and members of the groups is, in fact, one of the main reasons for the corporation in question to conduct surveys. However, departmental pressures leading to such stress differences are diverse and do not lend themselves to a macro-analysis.

6. Two more reasons why a UAI by occupation makes no sense are that (1) occupational differences in rule orientation can be shown not to be stable from 1968 to 1972, and (2) the range of scores for stress across occupations is much smaller than across countries.

7. See also the strong sex effect for this question in the analysis of variance of Figure 2.3.

8. Interestingly, employees' employment stability answers for HERMES' subsidiary in Japan are not very different from those in other industrial countries: Only about 40 percent of respondents state that they want to stay until retirement. Abroad, the myth is widespread that all Japanese work under a system of permanent employment (*nenko*). It is likely that in purely Japanese companies the percentage of employees wanting to stay until retirement is higher; but even there, the *nenko* system is used less often than non-Japanese believe; and actual labor turnover in Japan is not so low.

9. A study like Lynn's only makes sense for developed countries where a certain level of medical care and a certain accuracy of statistics exist. Haas (1969) has factor-analyzed medical variables for 72 countries (including less-developed ones) together with political variables. In this case, all death causes tend to converge on a "medical development" factor which runs parallel with economic development.

10. Both correlations are statistically significant at the .01 level.

11. McClelland's later work compared with his earlier publications shows a shift in the connotations of the power motive. In his original study (1961: 168) he suggests that "a combination of high n_{pow} and low n_{aff} is very closely associated with the tendency of a nation to resort to totalitarian methods in governing its people." More recently, McClelland applied measures of need strength to more and less successful business managers in the United States and concluded that the "better managers we studied are high in power motivation, low in affiliation motivation" (McClelland and Burnham, 1976: 103). Should this explain why some successful business managers sympathize with totalitarian regimes?

12. Bennett (1977) has shown that among managers working for U.S. banks, a low LPC was functional in the Philippines but not in Hong Kong.

13. Inkeles and Levinson (1969: 476) write about Germany (which is above average in UAI): "[A] major contributing power in the fall of the Weimar republic was the inability of large numbers of Germans to tolerate the necessity for political compromise."

14. Seeman (1977: 775), comparing 450 French with 450 U.S. workers, found the former much more frequently believing that "experts" should make political decisions; this fits with the UAI score differences between these countries.

15. In Putnam's study, attitudes of German civil servants are most polarized. SPD-sympathizing civil servants who mostly arrived on the scene later tend to be more "politically" oriented than CDU-sympathizing employees who more frequently take a "classical" stand. Putnam's study contains questions more conceptually related to PDI and others more related to UAI; on the first, Germany and Great Britain produce more similar answers.

16. $Rho = .90$, significant at the .05 level.

17. During World War II, the German occupants introduced identity cards in the Netherlands. This was the first procedure to be abolished when the Germans left.

18. $Rho = .85$, significant at the .001 level.

19. Theories based on unfalsifiable hypotheses, such as those by Freud and Marx, will be more popular in high UAI countries (see Magee, 1975: 44 on Karl Popper).

20. This explains the influence of German social scientists like Lewin and Adorno who emigrated to the United States.

21. For an analysis of different national interests in the area of organization theory see Hofstede and Kassem (1976: 22).

22. Eysenck (1954: 178) used a distinction based on work by Guilford between two personality factors: Neuroticism and Extraversion. He related (for individuals) Tough-Mindedness to Extraversion. Eysenck's student, Lynn, operationalized the factors of Neuroticism and Extraversion on the societal level. As I showed, UAI is correlated in this case with Neuroticism and *not* with Extraversion.

Chapter 5

INDIVIDUALISM

exercise "Life Goals," in Bass and Franke's Organizational Success Questionnaire, and in Morris' Ways to Live. IDV is correlated significantly with Need for Affiliation in McClelland's content analysis of 1925 children's readers. All these and some other correlates of IDV are integrated into a coherent list of connotations of individualism as a country characteristic.

It also appears that IDV is correlated with several country-level indicators; it correlates .82 with GNP per capita, and also with geographical latitude, with the size of the HERMES subsidiary, and with various characteristics of political and economic systems (such as occupational mobility, sectoral equality, and press freedom). From this, a picture of the Individualism-Collectivism dimension of societal norms can be drawn, as well as some inferences about its origins and consequences. The latter are separated into consequences (1) for society at large; (2) for religion, ideology, and theory; and (3) for organizations.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COLLECTIVITY

Individualism in Society

Some animals, like wolves, are gregarious, and others are solitary, like tigers. The human species should no doubt be classified with the gregarious animals, but different human societies show gregariousness to different degrees. Here again, then, we have a fundamental dimension on which societies differ: the relationship between the individual and the collectivity.

If we look across a broad range of human societies, traditional as well as modern, we recognize differences in gregariousness through, for example, differences in the complexity of the family units in which people live and which affect their day-to-day behavior. Some people live in nuclear families: husband, wife, and children; others in (patrilineal or matrilineal) extended families, or clans with grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins¹; others in tribal units based on kinship ties of an even more distant nature. Blumberg and Winch (1972) support a "curvilinear hypothesis" for the relationship between family complexity and the complexity of societies as they develop from traditional to modern. Very traditional hunting-gathering tribes tend to live in nuclear families. In more complex agricultural societies, people tend to live in extended families, clans, or tribal units. However, as agricultural societies develop toward still more complex urban-industrial societies, family complexity decreases again and extended families disintegrate into nuclear families², while grandparents are sent to homes for the aged and single relatives lead solitary lives. Thus, modern industrial man in this respect reapproaches the state of the hunter-gatherer. In several cases in modern society even the nuclear family is threatened with disintegration; but attempts to replace it by some other institution which takes account of the fundamental gregariousness of human nature so far have not been very successful.

The relationship between the individual and the collectivity in human society is not only a matter of ways of living together, but it is intimately linked with societal norms (in the sense of value systems of major groups of the population: see Figure 1.4). It therefore affects both people's mental programming and the structure and functioning of many other types of institutions besides the family: educational, religious, political, and utilitarian. The central element in our mental programming in-

SUMMARY OF THIS CHAPTER

The third dimension of national culture is called Individualism. It describes the relationship between the individual and the collectivity which prevails in a given society. It is reflected in the way people live together—for example, in nuclear families, extended families, or tribes; and it has all kinds of value implications. In some cultures, individualism is seen as a blessing and a source of well-being; in others, it is seen as alienating. Sociology has provided us with a variety of distinctions associated with the individualism dimension, of which the best known is probably Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft* (low individualism) versus *Gesellschaft* (high individualism).

The HERMES data bank has allowed the computation for each of the 40 countries of a country Individualism Index (IDV): It opposes in particular the importance of time for personal life on the high IDV side versus the importance of being trained by the company on the low IDV side. The same index is not suitable for distinguishing among occupations, sexes, age groups, or individuals, however. The Individualism Index is negatively correlated with the Power Distance Index, but some countries (the Latin European ones) show both high individualism and large power distances. The stronger a country's individualism, the less the tendency of HERMES respondents to say "yes" to questions in the survey ("acquiescence"). Individualism is related to a variety of other questions in the HERMES questionnaire. The individualism dimension is also found in work goal scores by managers attending courses at IMEDE. It is associated with the answers on Gordon's Surveys of Values for manager and student samples, and with various questions in Haire et al.'s 14-country study on "Managerial Thinking." An individualism ecological dimension can be shown to exist in Bass'

volved in this case is our self-concept. "The tradition-directed person . . . hardly thinks of himself as an individual" (Riesman et al., 1953: 33). A different self-concept is evident when we compare western with Chinese thinking. Hsu (1971) shows that the western concept of "personality" does not exist in the Chinese tradition. In our concept of "personality," we consider it as a separate entity distinct from society and culture. Hsu sees this as a reflection of western individualist thought. The Chinese use the word *jen* (*jin* in Japanese) for "man" in order to describe a "human constant" which includes the person himself plus his intimate societal and cultural environment which makes his existence meaningful. The Chinese will modify their views more easily in terms of their environment. Later in this chapter it will be shown that the Chinese-majority countries Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore score considerably lower on individualism than the countries of the western world.

An example of the consequence of a more individualistic or more collectivistic self-concept is the case of religious or ideological conversion. In western individualist society, converting oneself is a highly individual act³; if I would convert myself to, for example, Catholicism or Communism, it is unlikely that even my closest relatives would follow me. However, the history of all great religions is one of collective rather than individual conversions. "Then he . . . got baptized instantly, *he and all his family* . . . overjoyed like all his household at having believed in God" (Acts 16:33-34, New Testament, translation by J. Moffatt). Similarly, in modern China ideological conversions tend to take place collectively. This is not just a matter of deference to more powerful persons; rather, people have a sense of collective identity which makes it only natural that they should change together.

Because they are tied to value systems shared by the majority, issues of collectivism versus individualism carry strong moral overtones. Americans see their own culture as very individualistic; and this individualism is interpreted as a major contributor to the greatness of the United States. In their classic study *The Lonely Crowd*, Riesman et al. (1953) distinguish between "tradition-directed types," who are typical for traditional societies with high birth rates and high death rates, and "inner-directed types" who are typical for societies in periods of transitional growth. For example, the United States in the eighteenth through twentieth centuries. Inner-directed types have no stable traditions to go by; rather, they are guided by a "psychological gyroscope" (1953: 31) which is set during their early education and keeps them on a steady track in a turbulent environment. Riesman et al. quote a gravestone inscription of an eighteenth-century American, Thomas Darling: "A gentleman of strong mental powers . . . habituated to contemplation and reading . . . in moral reasoning . . . of deep penetration and sound judgement . . . with a rational and firm faith in his God and Saviour: he knew no other master" (1953: 133). Riesman et al. do not restrict their concept of inner-directedness to people brought up in the "Protestant Ethic"; they find it equally present in, for example, descendants of Catholic cultures. In fact, Riesman et al.'s concern is that the "inner-directed" type is disappearing in the United States and that an incipient decline of population stimulates a new stabilization around another dominant type, the "other-directed" American: a new kind of collectivist who takes his bearings from his peer group and from the mass media. The data in this chapter will show, however, that at least inside the HERMES corporation a comparison of U.S. employees with their counterparts from other

nations shows the former around 1970 still scoring higher on individualism than all others.

A very different moral stance is found in China. For Mao Tse-tung, individualism is evil. Individualism and liberalism, for Mao, are manifest in the selfishness and aversion to discipline characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie. The selfish behavior which Mao condemns is not necessarily behavior at the expense of others. It is sufficient to place personal interests above those of the group or simply to devote too much attention to one's own things (Ho, 1978b: 395-396). Mao's anti-individualistic, pro-collectivistic ethos is deeply rooted in the Chinese tradition. Collectivism does not mean a negation of the individual's well-being or interest; it is implicitly assumed that maintaining the group's well-being is the best guarantee for the individual (Ho, 1978a: 2). In the collectivistic Chinese society (and in other Asiatic societies, such as Japan, as well), the individual is not "inner-directed" at all but controlled by a need for not losing face. "Face"—a literal translation of the Chinese *lien* and *mien-tsu*—"is lost when the individual, either through his action or that of people closely related to him, fails to meet essential requirements placed upon him by virtue of the social position he occupies" (Ho, 1976: 867).

Not all western thinkers are happy with individualism, of course, and not all eastern thinkers with collectivism. There is a certain symmetry between the criticism of western society by Brittan (1977) and the criticism of Japanese society by Kawasaki (1969). The first stresses the alienation of the "privatized" individual; the second the tyranny of the collectivity. They represent the devil and the deep blue sea, between which societies and man within them have to steer their course.

The different forms of society that go with more collectivistic and more individualistic self-concepts were recognized early by sociologists. Tönnies (1887 [1963]) introduced the distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (translated in the English version of his book as "community" versus "society"). These terms describe two types of social entities. *Gemeinschaft* entities result from mutual sympathy, habit, or common beliefs and are "willed" for their intrinsic value to their members; *Gesellschaft* entities are intended by their constituents to be means to specific ends (Heberle, 1968: 100). Tönnies further noted in history a transition from a predominantly *Gemeinschaft*-like to a predominantly *Gesellschaft*-like social order, which he attributed to increasing commercialization, the rise of the modern state, and the progress of science (1968: 101).

An association between the degree of collectivism or individualism in a society and its degree of modernity is suggested by at least three of the sources quoted above: by Blumberg and Winch, who associate modernity with lower familial complexity,⁴ by Riesman et al., who associate transitional growth with inner-directedness, and by Tönnies, who associates the modern state with *Gesellschaft*. Hofstede (1980b: 45) refers to other studies that suggest that a society's degree of economic evolution or modernity is a major determinant of societal norms. This chapter will show that among the four dimensions of national culture found empirically in the HERMES data, it is the individualism-versus-collectivism dimension which relates most closely to a country's level of economic development.

Triandis (1971: 8) summarizes psychological studies on the effect of modernization on attitudes as follows:

Modern man . . . is open to new experiences; relatively independent of parental authority; concerned with time, planning, willing to defer gratification; he feels that man can be the master over nature, and that he controls the reinforcements he receives from his environment; he believes in determinism and science; he has a wide, cosmopolitan perspective, he uses broad ingroups; he competes with standards of excellence, and he is optimistic about controlling his environment. Traditional man has narrow ingroups, looks at the world with suspicion, believes that good is limited and one obtains a share of it by chance or pleasing the gods; he identifies with his parents and receives direction from them; he considers planning a waste of time, and does not defer gratification; he feels at the mercy of obscure environmental factors, and is prone to mysticism; he sees interpersonal relations as an end, rarely as means to an end; he does not believe that he can control his environment but rather sees himself under the influence of external, mystical powers.

In Chapter 1 (p. 36) I referred to Parsons and Shils' (1951: 77) "pattern variables" which are part of their "General Theory of Action." From the five pattern variables suggested, it is especially number 2, "Self-orientation versus Collectivity orientation," that calls for association with our individualism-collectivism dimension. Parsons and Shils wrote:

The high frequency of situations in which there is a disharmony of interests creates the problem of choosing between action for private goals or on behalf of collective goals. This dilemma may be resolved by the actor either by giving primacy to interests, goals and values shared with other members of a given collective unit of which he is a member, or by giving primacy to his personal or private interests without considering their bearing on collective interest [1951: 80-81].

In his later work, Parsons dropped "Self-orientation versus Collectivity orientation" as a pattern variable: It did not fit into the tight paradigm he developed (Rocher, 1974: 52, 43). In Parsons' theory of the evolution of societies (Parsons, 1977), the self-versus-collectivity orientation distinction is not used. Parsons' other pattern variables are less clearly conceptually related to the individualism-collectivism dimension. However, it will appear later on in this chapter that pattern variable number 3, "Universalism versus Particularism," is statistically related to individualism. This variable refers to whether or not value systems should take particular relationship systems of the actor into account (such as family or friendship ties). The individualist society also tends to be universalist (particular relationships should *not* be counted).

Individualism in Organizations

The norm prevalent in a given society as to the degree of individualism/collectivism expected from its members will strongly affect the nature of the relationship between a person and the organization to which he or she belongs. More collectivist societies call for greater emotional dependence of members on their organizations; in a society in equilibrium, the organizations should in return assume a broad responsibility for their members. Whenever organizations cease to do that—as in the incipient capitalism in nineteenth-century Europe, and today in many less-developed countries—there is disharmony between people's values and the social order; this will lead to either a shift in values toward more individualism, or pressure toward a different, more collectivist social order (such as state socialism), or both.

Individualism

The level of individualism/collectivism in society will affect the organization's members' reasons for complying with organizational requirements. Following the terminology introduced by Etzioni (1975), we can assume more "moral" involvement with the organization where collectivist values prevail, and more "calculative" involvement where individualist values prevail. Etzioni distinguishes between "pure" and "social" moral involvement: "Pure" moral involvement tends to develop in vertical relationships, such as those between teachers and students, priests and parishioners, leaders and followers. "Social" involvement tends to develop in horizontal relationships like those in various types of primary groups. Both pure moral and social orientations might be found in the same relationships, but as a rule, one orientation predominates (1975: 11). We can relate pure moral involvement to the values of the subordinate in a high power distance society, and social involvement to the values of the organization member in a collectivist society. As we will see later in this chapter, high power distance and collectivism go together in most, but not all, societies.

The level of individualism/collectivism in society will also affect what type of persons will be admitted into positions of special influence in organizations. A useful distinction in this case is Merton's "locals" versus "cosmopolitans" (Merton, 1968: 447, first published in 1949; the terms derive from a translation of Tönnies' work). The local type is largely preoccupied with problems inside the organization; this type is likely to become influential in a more collectivist climate. The cosmopolitan type must maintain a minimum set of relations within the organization, but he or she considers him or herself as an integral part of the world outside it. We would rather find cosmopolitans in positions of influence in organizations where a more individualist norm prevails. We shall see evidence for this in the HERMES data.

The degree of individualism in organizations obviously will depend on many other factors besides a societal norm: We can expect effects of employee educational level and of the organization's own history and subculture. Also predictable is a relationship with organization size. In a study among workers of large and small production firms in Bradford, England, Ingham (1970: 117ff) found more moral involvement in the smaller firms, more calculative in the larger. This suggests a positive correlation between organization size and individualism, which, as we shall see later in this chapter, is supported by the HERMES data.

There is an obvious relationship between the organization's technology and the position of its members on the individualism-collectivism continuum. Technologies developed in western individualist settings more or less presuppose an individualist mentality in entrepreneurs, managers, and workers which is part of "modernity" (Stinchcombe, 1965: 145ff; Triandis, 1973: 166). Introducing such technologies in more collectivist countries represents one of the main forces toward a shift of societal norms in those countries (Figure 1.4). On the other hand, the collectivist value pattern in more traditional societies sets a limit to the technology transfer possibilities; this is one of the dilemmas of economic development of poor countries. One solution is sought in the transfer of "intermediate" or "appropriate" technologies which are better adapted to what already exists in the traditional collectivist societies. Another solution is the local design of political and organizational structures which allow collectivism and modern technology to co-exist. Examples are Japan, China, the

Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. To what extent these designs will be effective barriers against increased individualism if technology advances only history will tell. In spite of the successful integration of modern technology with more traditional Japanese and Chinese values, there are definite signs of increasing individualism in these countries as well. I shall deal with shifts in individualism at greater length in Chapter 8.

The individualism-collectivism dimension is also visible in the normative organization theories coming from different countries. The United States is the major exporter of modern organization theories, but its position of extreme individualism in comparison to most other countries makes the relevance of some of its theories in other cultural environments doubtful. As we saw, in the United States there is a strong feeling that individualism is good and collectivism bad. Riesman et al. were concerned about the "inner-directed" type being replaced by an "other-directed" one. In his now classic bestseller *The Organization Man*, William H. Whyte, Jr. (1956) accused the modern big U.S. organization of destroying individualism and exhorted the individual to defend himself against collectivist organizational pressures. Among other things, Whyte supplied a practical guide "How to Cheat on Personality Tests" (1956: 449).⁵ The strong feelings about the desirability of individualism in the United States make it difficult for some Americans to understand that people in less individualistically oriented societies want to resolve societal and organizational problems in ways other than the American one.⁶

One of the rare non-American collections of organization theory literature is a volume of European contributions co-edited by the present author (Hofstede and Kassem, 1976). In it, Hjelholt, who is from Denmark, argues for the importance of the organization and its external and internal boundaries as sources of collective identity for the members:

I think the identity of groups and systems is important. Without identity the system or the group is neither productive nor satisfying as a place to live. And if we have to get our identity from other systems and just be a prisoner in the working organization, we create a society which is clearly asking for trouble.

From this outburst you can guess my attitude toward the predominantly American organization theories advocating the organization structure as matrix-organizations or temporary systems. I think that the theories which try to get away with or loosen boundaries are attacking the group identities, and in this way, while temporarily ensuring flexibility inside the organization, they export problems to the outside, where we get a society of alienated, rootless individuals. I feel much more in accordance with the moves of groups to extend or redefine their boundaries, trying to let their values influence the organization as a whole. I refer to the unions' demand for a better work environment, their demand to be included in decision-making for the whole organization, and the like [Hjelholt, 1976: 241-242].

Of course, American unions do not as a rule demand to be included in this type of decision-making; unions in some European countries do. This is no accident; union-management relationships, too, reflect dominant value systems. The quote from Hjelholt shows that a normative stance in favor of individualism is not the only possibility for the organization theorist and that a different value position leads to a different theory.

MEASURING NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN INDIVIDUALISM IN HERMES

An Individualism Index for HERMES Countries

The HERMES data allow the computation of an Individualism Index for the 40 countries. This index and the Masculinity Index, with which we shall deal in Chapter 6, use country mean answer scores on the 14 "work goals" questions: questions of the format "How important is it to you to . . ."; for example, "How important is it to you to have an opportunity for high earnings?" or "How important is it to you to fully use your skills and abilities on the job?" For the 14 questions, see Figure 5.1, which also lists the short names which I shall use for the sake of convenience to refer to them.

FIGURE 5.1 Fourteen Work Goals Used in All Questionnaires 1968-1973

Number ^a	Short name	Full questionnaire wording
A5 (15)	Challenge	Have challenging work to do - work from which you can get a personal sense of accomplishment
A6 (18)	Desirable area	Live in an area desirable to you and your family
A7 (1)	Earnings	Have an opportunity for high earnings
A8 (6)	Cooperation	Work with people who cooperate well with one another
A9 (9)	Training	Have training opportunities (to improve your skills or learn new skills)
A10 (4)	Benefits	Have good fringe benefits
A11 (12)	Recognition	Get the recognition you deserve when you do a good job.
A12 (11)	Physical conditions	Have good physical working conditions (good ventilation and lighting, adequate work space, etc.).
A13 (7)	Freedom	Have considerable freedom to adapt your own approach to the job.
A14 (2)	Employment security	Have the security that you will be able to work for your company as long as you want to.
A15 (17)	Advancement	Have an opportunity for advancement to higher level jobs.
A16 (19)	Manager	Have a good working relationship with your manager.
A17 (21)	Use of skills	Fully use your skills and abilities on the job.
A18 (5)	Personal time	Have a job which leaves you sufficient time for your personal or family life.

^aSee Appendix 1. Numbers between parentheses indicate the order of the questions in the 1968-1971 questionnaires.